Situating Haiti's Recent Elections: Sorting Through The Misinformation (by Corinne Segura)
Establishing facts is a near impossibility in Haiti, where claims and counterclaims fly freely
- The Economist, Oct 23, 2004
1990 - Aristide, a leftist popular Catholic Priest, wins the country's first democratic election after an era of brutal dictators
1991 - A coup, in which the CIA is involved, overthrows Aristide and a bloody regime takes over
1994 - Clinton reinstalls Aristide under neoliberal conditions
2000 - Aristide wins the great majority of the vote with small irregularities in the elections; the intentional community freezes aid
2004 - Aristide is forced out of the country in an invasion by a criminal gang
2005 - Aristide remains in exile
- The interim government scrambles to create an environment in which elections can take place
- The country is mired by partisan violence, human rights abuses, theft, kidnappings, economic destruction and increasing poverty
February 7, 2006 - Elections finally take place again after being delayed four times since Aristide's ousting
February 16, 2006 - René Préval wins the elections
After many attempts by the U.S. government and other elite to squash persistent leftist politics in Haiti, René Préval, a popular candidate supported by the poor majority, won Haiti's recent elections on February 7. These were the first elections held after the ousting of the democratically elected government two years ago.
The questions everyone is asking are can these elections reinstate order and can a democratically elected leader rule in the poorest and most 'chaotic' country in the Americas?
If we want an answer to this question, we must first look back to see how democracy was stolen and why the state collapsed two years ago. It is vital to understand this context in order to understand what is happening in Haiti now and to discover ways to move forward.
Misinformation propagated by the press and those opposed to Aristide allowed the U.S. to destabilize the Haitian state in 2004. They were able to push the democratically elected government out without any significant outcry from the international community. Furthermore, they were able to install a non-elected interim government that took actions the people never voted for. Now that elections are recommencing, some mainstream papers are starting to acknowledge U.S. involvement in the coup two years ago; however, many still convey misinformation, preventing the public from really understanding what is happening in Haiti today.
For this article, we performed a review of The New York Times (NYT) and The Economist from early 2004 until the present. As two highly respected news outlets, they are our guide to the views of 'the mainstream press'. For the other side of the story, this paper uses the alternative press, including publications such as Democracy Now! and Znet. From our position outside Haiti, all we can do is rely on these differing accounts of reality and try and sort through 'the facts'.
Creating the context: Misinformation and the 2004 coup
Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation of the "rebel" movement as significant and of Aristide as a corrupt and illegitimate ruler was key in order for the international community to justify its decision not to intervene to protect the Haitian government from the invaders that destabilized the state in 2004. The other side sees Aristide as the democratically elected leader, who made some mistakes, but still held the support of the majority. For each side, the story unfolds quite differently.
The NYT stated over and over that Aristide was "widely disliked" and that he had lost much of his support. The statement, reworded, can be found in most mainstream journalistic articles. His supporters, it seemed, consisted of armed youth gangs in the slums and little more.
Only one article from both The NYT and The Economist remarks that supporters of Lavalas, Aristide's party, "continue to be the majority of the country''. This fact has been proven to be true in these recent elections; although Lavalas boycotted the elections, Préval, a former Aristide ally, has much of the same support base.
Most articles explain that Aristide's "loss of support" was due to corruption and illegitimacy of the government, and therefore American officials claim that "it would have been wrong to have saved him". Accusations were focused purely on the flawed elections of 2000, general corruption, and the use of armed gangs to carry out the president's work.
Jared Ferrie reports that "the 2000 elections were seriously flawed [and this] was one of the myths that helped to undermine Aristide". The idea gave support to the view that Aristide was an illegitimate ruler. After exploring the election controversy, Ferrie claims that the "irregularities were fairly minor and that neither the Organisation of American States (which oversaw the elections), the U.S. government, nor the opposition deny that the vast majority of Haitians voted for Aristide's Lavalas party. Of the over 7,000 positions filled, the dispute centred around the election of seven senators". These senators later gave up their seats due to the irregularities. This was just one of several facts left out of the majority of press coverage.
Other accusations focus on the corruption involved in the election process. A convicted cocaine trafficker accused Aristide of taking drug payoffs. It has been said that drugs corrupted the Lavalas party to the core. Something that came up in almost every article were the "notorious slum gangs", or "chimeres", that Aristide apparently armed and controlled. What the State Department downplayed was that it was the former military officers who were at the root of the violence.
The sources of information for the mainstream account need to be verified. There is no evidence that Aristide armed or directed violence in the slums, while a convicted cocaine dealer's statement is hardly evidence of drug affiliations within the party. Raids in the slums in search of weapons have been in vain. It is true and should be noted that Aristide was guilty of crimes, and there are Lavalas party supporters who use violence (in defense, they claim); however, the accounts of both of the aforementioned seem grossly exaggerated.
Many articles present the rebel gang that overthrew Aristide as successful, because Aristide was so disliked that he could be "toppled by a rag-tag army of as few as 200 rebels", says The Economist. A senior United Nations official suggested that "the rebels have the support of the population''. In one NYT article, the only illustration of the response of the Haitian people to Aristide's exit was that "crowds gathered at the presidential palace to cheer triumphant rebels entering the city". With the majority of the population supporting Aristide, there is clearly a disjunction between the two pictures.
Most articles give some context about who the 'rebels' are at least, but only one explains fully that the euphemism 'rebels' means convicted murderers, former brutal police chiefs, suspected drug traffickers, former paramilitary leaders and death squad veterans. No article seems to question why convicted criminals, who had escaped from jail, were holding press conferences and were permitted to remain free.
Lack of Context / Missing information
Much of the information we receive regarding Haiti lacks true development about American intervention and involvement. The mainstream media leaves out details on the aid embargo, the funding of opposition groups, the American role in the creation of a paramilitary and army, and Clinton's re-installment of Aristide in 1994. These actions, if mentioned, are usually portrayed as pro-democracy. The critics on the other hand, see ample evidence of an American attempt to squash Aristide and his mandate (that was continued by the U.S.-backed interim government).
The press often mentioned that $500 million in loans (from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) were withheld from Aristide's government in response to the corrupt elections. It was not pointed out that the embargo remained even after all senators who held contested seats resigned. Also left out is the well known fact that the U.S. had supported numerous brutal dictators "whom never had an embargo on them no matter how many atrocities they were carrying out", points out Noam Chomsky. It should be fairly clear from a brief glance at history that aid embargoes are not intended to foster democracy. Instead, says Ferrie, "by blocking aid and loans, the United States effectively crippled Aristide's government, making it impossible to pursue any large-scale, meaningful social and economic development program".
The mainstream media noted that $76m in aid from the U.S., aimed at Haitian non-governmental organizations, remained, yet the media fails fail to question where the money ended up. Throughout Aristide's term, the Bush I administration (as well as the Canadian and French governments) simply shifted millions of dollars from development aid for the democratically elected government to 'democratic forces. These forces included wealthy elite and business people, murderers, and criminals from the past military and paramilitary who formed the political opposition groups that were expected to enhance democracy.
Rarely cited in most press is that the army and the paramilitary group from which many of the 'rebel' leaders came were installed and funded by the U.S. government. FRAPH, the "paramilitary terrorist organisation under the regime that overthrew Aristide in [his first term in] 1991, came to be viewed by the U.S. as 'a legitimate opposition party'", says Ferrie. Others come from the army that was created by the United States forces. In the 1980's and early 1990's, the CIA had high-ranking Haitian Army officers and FRAPH members on its payroll. These facts did merit mention in The NYT.
Also suppressed in the media were "the conditions that Clinton imposed for Aristide's return [in 1994]: that he adopt the program of the defeated U.S. candidate in the 1990 elections, a former World Bank official who had received 14% of the vote", points out Chomsky. The US planners must have known that the neoliberal program that Aristide had to adopt would demolish the remaining shreds of economic sovereignty, prevent economic development, and destabilize the government. It is "one of the best-confirmed lessons of economic history", says Chomsky.
By ignoring their involvement, the U.S. was able to further justify non-intervention. Colin Powell claimed that the U.S. "cannot allow these thugs to come out of the hills, or even an opposition to simply rise up and say 'we want you to leave' [to Aristide] in an undemocratic, nonconstitutional manner''. Yet the U.S. also proclaimed that the rebels were "a Haitian problem", and so they allowed them to take over.
The international community would not provide 100 peacekeepers to prevent the thugs from removing the democratically elected government. But once the rebels, and pressure from the US, had removed Aristide, the U.S. brought in the marines and helped install the interim government. A multinational force then entered (including 500 troops from Canada) to 'secure Haiti for democracy'.
The Americans were then in the "awkward position", as The NYT puts it, "of seeming to have pushed a freely elected president from power" . The mainstream media remained conservative in their critique of the U.S., though the criticism of inaction is too obvious to be avoided by some and has coming to light more recently.
Consequences
This version of the story, full of misinformation, clearly prevented public outcry by American, Canadian, French and other citizens that may have dissuaded their governments from taking the course that they did. If it had been pointed out that a democratically elected leader was being overthrown with the blessing of the Canadian government (among others), people may have demanded that we stop the 'rebels'.
For the 80% of Haiti's 8 million citizens who live bellow the poverty line, this has had serious consequences. In the months following the coup "levels of malnutrition and disease spiked,…while high commodity and fuel prices have increased the cost of living for ordinary Haitians", reports Erickson. The price of Haiti's staple food, rice, almost doubled. There was no water and almost no electricity in the capital, Port-au-Prince, if you could not afford a generator. Public services ceased to function.
After the Coup
The non-elected, U.S.-backed, interim government instituted neoliberal reforms, publicly supported the criminals, and jailed top Lavalas candidates on dubious charges. The police opened fire on peaceful Aristide protests and the UN violently attacked pro-Aristide slums.
No one tried to capture the real criminals, such as convicted criminal/rebel leader Mr. Chamblain. In fact the interim government allowed some of the criminal/rebel leaders, such as Guy Philippe, and Buteur Metayer, a gang leader, to create a new party. Philippe did in fact run in the recent elections while top Lavalas party officials could not run, for they were illegally held in jail. Due to this repression, the Lavalas party boycotted the elections. The mainstream press failed to express the outrageousness of this situation.
The February 2006 elections
As usual, it is after the fact that some of the truth becomes known to the public. Now many articles in The NYT are citing the involvement of the U.S. For example, the International Republican Institute funded and trained the opposition, and the interim government dismissed the charges of the criminal Mr. Chamblain in a trial that rights groups called a sham.
Unfortunately, the damage the coup brought upon Haiti has already been done.
If we want to make sense of the recent elections, and think about where Haiti is going, it is imperative that we dig through the misinformation propagated by the U.S. and the press in order to truly understand Haiti's situation.
It should not be surprising that the elections this February were full of irregularities. Evidence does appear to support Préval's charges that the elections were rigged against him. But, in the end, he was the clear winner, and the runner up only had 12% of the vote. However much the world powers and Haitian elite try, it is impossible to stop the poor majority of Haitians from democratically choosing someone whom they believe represent them.
If we want to know whether these elections can restore hope in Haiti we have to ask: will the U.S., the international community and Haitian elite accept the Haitian people's choice? Or will they try again to veto democratic results that they don't like?
If we know a little history we can be confident that those with power will seek to limit the implementation of a mandate that will bring serious improvements to the lives of the poor in Haiti. Neoliberal programs have already been set in motion by the interim government. Préval will have to manage the hopes of the millions of poor who voted for him with economic, political and social foreign penetration, as well as bring back the state from economic and political collapse.
Sources
Sanger, David e. and Eric Schmitt. “Bush Increases Push for Haitian to Leave Office.” New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). New York, N.Y.: 29 Feb. 2004. pg. 1.1.
Thompson, Ginger. “A Bitterly Divided Haiti Is Lurching Toward an Election.” New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). New York, N.Y.: 30 Oct. 2005. pg. 1.6.
Thompson, Ginger and Amy Bracken. “Deal Reached To Name Victor In Haiti's Vote.” The New York Times. 16 Feb. 2006.
Thompson, Ginger and Amy Bracken. “Haitians Dance for Joy as Preval Is Declared Winner.” The New York Times. 17 Feb. 2006.
Weiner, Tim. “Aristide Raised Haiti's Hopes, Then Shattered Them.” New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). New York, N.Y.: 1 Mar. 2004. pg. A.10.
Weiner, Tim and Lydia Polgreen. “Veterans of Past Murderous Campaigns Are Leading Haiti's New Rebellion.” New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). New York, N.Y.: 29 Feb. 2004. pg. 1.6.
Wines, Michael. “Aristide, Now in Central African Republic, Has Harsh Words for the Haitian Rebels.” New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). New York, N.Y.: Mar. 2, 2004. pg. A.10.
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