The Gang Crisis in Central America (by Jennifer Yang)

Many of the civil wars that have long plagued Central America have finally ended, yet their collective plethora of bitter legacies have caused another conflict to rear its ugly head: overwhelming gang violence. Years of civil war has left a number of residual problems in its wake – displacement, corruption, violence, and poverty – all conditions that have dangerously aligned to create the perfect breeding ground for gang culture.

Whopping statistics reflect the magnitude of Central America's gang problem. There are over 50,000 gang members estimated to be active in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Violence is skyrocketing, as between 2001 and 2004 in Guatemala alone, homicides have increased by 40%, a reality that affects girls and women especially, as they make up 1200 of these homicide cases. Money is being extorted, the drug trade is flourishing, and weapons, people and stolen vehicles flow through the porous American borders. In fact, it is estimated that 80% of the cars driven in Central America are stolen from the United States. The major civil wars were declared over by the 1990s, yet Central America still retains a climate of war as the areas continues to be rife with violence, corruption and fear.

The severity of the situation begs the question: what exactly has caused the gang problem in Central America to become so dire? One is inclined to point fingers at the usual suspects, such as job shortages and lack of education. Surprisingly, however, a major contributing factor to Central America's gang problem has actually been the failings of the U.S. government. During the civil wars, millions of refugees fled from Central America to the United States, many of them settling in poor neighbourhoods of California or Washington. These refugees, especially the youth, were not readily accepted into their adopted environment and made for easy targets of established local gangs. In a bid for protection, several of these displaced youths then started their own gangs (such as the notorious Mara Salvatrucha or Mara 18), which offered them a sense of belonging, identity and protection.

In 1996, the United States enacted immigration reform laws under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). This policy widened the grounds upon which deportation would be allowed for non-American criminals. All non-citizens sentenced to one year in jail or more were henceforth subject to deportation, including those convicts who were guilty of only minor misdemeanours. As a result, a mass exportation of criminals took place, many of whom were gang members, and over 80,000 people have since been deported to Central America. These gang members relocated en masse brought with them ties to the drug and weapons trade, as well as an American-taught criminal sophistication. To exacerbate matters, U.S. officials were sometimes prohibited from disclosing the criminal backgrounds of certain convicts (this regrettable flaw was to be finally changed as of January 2005) and consequently, Central American authorities received insufficient information with which to properly handle the influx of prisoners.

These exported gang members then arrived in Central America only to experience alienation, for many have not been back in several years and have become culturally disjointed. Gang members were thus forced to cling to their gangs with even greater fervour, and youths not already belonging to a gang were thus rendered even more vulnerable to recruitment. It may be said that a disrupted family structure (many children have parents still working in the United States) and a bottleneck age demographic are two factors which compound the burgeoning gang problem in Central America. In Honduras, two-thirds of the population is 18 years old or younger, and as many as 600,000 of those people do not attend school or go to work. This means that there are over half a million idle children in Honduras who are therefore highly susceptible to gang recruitment.

Much concern is being raised at the federal level of government over the gang crisis, yet a proper response is still lacking. Political leaders have strongly supported a zero-tolerance policy known as "Manu Duro" or "Iron Fist," a tactic that is popular with many of the citizens terrorized by gangs. However, this heavy-handed approach has had the unfortunate outcome of engendering even more human rights abuses. People are now being arrested for what is known as "illicit association," following which two or more gang members are prohibited from being together. Youngsters can also be arrested for simply exhibiting gang-affiliated tattoos. In tandem with increasing levels of arrests are lengthier prison sentences for mere gang affiliation. All of these measures are infringements on civil liberties and rights in the guise of gang activity suppression.

Naturally, prisons have also become decrepit and grossly overcrowded, with jail occupancies doubling between 1999 and 2004. Prisoners are sometimes held for years before they are given a trial and thousands of inmates are forced to sleep on the ground or under beds. Funnelling prisoners, many of which are members of rival gangs, into cramped quarters has created a sort of grooming school for crime and conflict, and prison riots have become frequent and bloody. Granted, some rehabilitative measures have also been taken to undercut the gang problem, such as skills training for ex-gang members; however, gang members feel trapped in their life of violence, either because they have no other options or because they face likely harm if they leave their gang.

Despite the extreme measures taken by authorities, gang violence continues unabated and frustrated citizens have taken matters into their own hands. It is largely believed that vigilante groups have appropriated the task of regulating gang activity, and armed civilians are now known to patrol the streets. Security guards and off-duty police officers are also participating in what appears to be a dangerous "social cleansing" agenda, targeting young gang members and homeless children. According to the advocacy group Casa Alianza, 2200 gang-affiliated juveniles have been executed between 1998 and 2004 in concert with this initiative and the UN has now recognized Honduras as having one of the highest rates of youth slayings by security agents in the world. The government publicly denies such activities, yet according to Bruce Harris, the director of Casa Alianza, "the involvement of members of the security forces and other people acting with the implicit consent of the authorities is no longer rumour but verifiable fact." The government is likely well aware of such operations, yet have reacted only with complacency and denial.

The Central American government has thus far proven ineffective in quelling the ballooning gang problem. In fighting with brute force, the Central American government is only grasping at short-term solutions, much in the same way that the United States once did with its backfired immigration policies. It is truly necessary that the government install preventative measures in order to combat the underlying causes of gang culture. This includes actions such as improving education, creating jobs, curbing corruption, developing an efficient judicial system, and rehabilitating the economy; in short, mass social reform. International aid is crucial to this development and many Central American leaders believe that relief hinges upon the cooperation of the United States. The risk of this dependency, however, is that the U.S. has their own priorities; opponents to their involvement fear that the superpower will only absorb anti-gang efforts into their own agenda of protecting U.S. national security or improving international relations with Central America.

The gang problem of Central America continues in a downward spiral at an alarming rate, and without a focused and coordinated response, these countries will only layer more ineffectual band-aid solutions on top of the old ones they have already tacked on. America's involvement is crucial indeed, but in the form of a well-defined policy towards much needed social rehabilitation. Perhaps only then can there finally be some light at the end of a very dark and dismal tunnel, one that the U.S. government itself has had a hand in digging.

Sources

"Grim News in Central America: Wave of Gang Violence Grows." Resource Centre of the Americas. 29 Jan. 2004. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.americas.org/item_12>.

"Gangs: The Fatal Compulsion To Belong." Resource Centre of the Americas. 26 Apr. 2004. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.americas.org/item_14520>.

"Central America's Gang Crisis." Resource Centre of the Americas. 17 Sep. 2004. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.americas.org/item_16407>.

"Ex-gang members find jobs in region scarcer than ever." Resource Centre of the Americas. 25 Apr. 2005. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.americas.org/item_19187>.

"Central America's Crime Wave Spurs Plan for a Regional Force." Resource Centre of the Americas. 16 Aug. 2005. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.americas.org/item_21317>.

"In Guatemala, a rise In vigilante justice." Christian Science Monitor. 6 Oct. 2005. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1006/p06s01-woam.html>.

"A South American Import." National Alliance of Gang Investigators ASsociation. 12 Apr. 2005. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.nagia.org/mara_salvatrucha.htm>.

"Central America's Street Gangs Are Drawn into the World of Geopolitics." Power and Interest News Report. 26 Aug. 2005. 1 Dec. 2005 <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=354&language_id=1>.

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