Iran: The Conservatives Return (by Arash Rowshanzamir)

Who would have guessed that pietistic Muslims would ever take their religion seriously? Several months ago, Akbar-Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative who served as Iran's president from 1989-1997, announced after much deliberation that he would participate in the June 17th presidential election, much to the delight of moderate and reform-oriented Iranians around the world. At the time, the list of those who were to compete in the upcoming general election included advocates from all sides of the political spectrum, and adequately delineated the factional politics that has beleaguered Iran ever since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Mr. Rafsanjani's announcement instantaneously propelled the moderates as the frontrunners in the election, much to the chagrin of Iran's ruling clergy. And although the prognostication of political developments in Iran has become a near impossibility after the Islamic Revolution, not even the most optimistic conservative would have predicted that the presidency would fall into the hands of the most radical of all of the candidates, the mayor of Tehran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's victory did not come without controversy; for the first time in Iranian history, a presidential run-off was required. The first round, which was tarnished by allegations of vote rigging, intimidation and manipulation, saw the Iranian people elect two men with drastically contravening ideas between the aforementioned Hashemi Rafsanjani, a moderate former president and current head of the Expediency Council, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the hard-line conservative mayor of Tehran. Both men campaigned on platforms that contradicted each other: Mr. Rafsanjani promised to pursue relations with America, further implement the social reforms introduced under the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, and tackle the economic problems facing Iran, specifically unemployment and inflation. Mr. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, abstained from focusing on issues pertaining to human rights, liberal reform, and foreign policy. Rather, he decided to concentrate more on Islamic values while simultaneously stressing the need to tackle corruption and developmental issues within the country.

The second round garnered a much more concise result than the first, but was still marred by accusations of fraud. Mr. Ahmadinejad's followers, who witnessed their 'Robin Hood' accumulate close to twice as many votes as Mr. Rafsanjani, were once again accused of vote-rigging. It became apparent that elements loyal to Mr. Ahmadinejad were involved in skewing the results, manipulating ballots, and using elements of the media to foster public support for Mr. Ahmadinejad less than 24 hours prior to the opening of the polls, which is forbidden under Iranian law.

Although Mr. Ahmadinejad was one of the least known of all who were contending, he did have one advantage over all the other candidates: support from the clerical elite. Throughout the election, Mr. Ahmadinejad was backed by powerful conservatives that exercised their influence to mobilize support for him by using their powerful network of mosques. Mr. Ahmadinejad, a former member of the Revolutionary Guard, also had the support of the Basij militia, a militant volunteer force, and it is highly probable that both the Basij forces and the Revolutionary Guard were mobilized to vote for Mr. Ahmadinejad en masse, while simultaneously partaking in voter intimidation. In response to accusations of fraudulence, the Guardian Council, an unelected body responsible for preserving Islamic Law, carried out a partial recount of 100 boxes in several cities across Iran, and subsequently came to the conclusion that all accusations pertaining to foul play were, in fact, unfounded. However, the recount monitored by the Guardian Council was not extended to ballet boxes in the more remote rural areas of the country where vote-rigging would be considerably easier than in the populous cities.

More important than the actual winner of the election was the voter turnout. The divisive first round saw the participation of just over 60% of all eligible voters, while participation in the second round was approximately the same. Voter turnout is an important aspect of any election, particularly those carried out in suspect nations, as voter participation has a direct effect on the amount of legitimacy assigned to the incumbent government, both on a domestic and international scale.

So, who exactly is this Mr. Ahmadinejad and why are his values and beliefs so appealing to the majority of Iranians? The son of a blacksmith, Mr. Ahmadinejad studied civil engineering before obtaining his Ph.D. in traffic and transport from the University of Tehran. His desire for Islamic governance was magnified by the 1979 revolution, and was made notorious by his involvement in the US-hostage taking crisis of 1980. His tenure as mayor of Tehran was marked by the moderate re-structuring of the developmental calamity that became of the capital, but was more renowned for the curtailment of social reforms, as Mr. Ahmadinejad ordered the closure of many fast food restaurants, in addition to having male city employees grow beards and wear long sleeved shirts. His support was highest among lower class Iranians, the majority of which are devoutly Muslim, and was further spearheaded by his modest upbringing and impeccable religious credentials. With frustration mounting at the economic demise of Iran under the Khatami administration, religious devotion came to the forefront as many in Iran began to return the ideals of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, an opportunity seized amiably by the austere Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Is there a realistic possibility for rapprochement as far Iran's relationship with the West, specifically America, is concerned now that the conservatives are back in power? Optimism would say yes, but pragmatism points to no. It is highly unlikely that Mr. Ahmadinejad will look to dissolve the political quagmire that has come to describe Iran's relations with the 'Great Satan.' In fact, in his first public news conference as president, Mr. Ahmadinejad stated that restarting relations with America would not be an immediate priority of his administration. Mr. Ahmadinejad also stressed that Iran would continue to negotiate with Europe on matters relating to its nuclear program, but it is highly probable that dealing with the new president will prove to be a much bigger challenge than dealing with the previous reformist administration. The question then has to be asked: what should the international community do in order to deal with the beleaguered Islamic Republic? Although the answer is difficult to ascertain, as Iran's political situation since the death of Khomeini would be described as sensitive at best, a potential response could, and probably should, come in the form of UN sanctions.

When Khomeini and his followers came into power in 1979, they banned all forms of contraception- a concept coincidentally favored by the late Pope John Paul II. This decision rendered a socio-political disaster as birth rates skyrocketed in the subsequent decade, partly because, at the time, polygamy was not an uncommon practice, particularly in the less-developed, rural areas of the country. The result can be seen today in the fact that over half of Iran's population is under the age of 25, and in a country where the official unemployment rate is at 11% (a realistic figure would be twice as much), political tensions tend to run high, especially between the Islamic clergy and the countries increasingly frustrated youth.

If the United Nations Security Council were to successfully impose sanctions on Iran and suppress oil revenues, the result would be an utter disaster. Although Iran's economy is a multi-faceted one, it still depends heavily on its oil revenues. Therefore, a boycott of Iranian oil exports would not only suffocate the country's income, but would dry up a potentially large number of jobs as well. This would not go well with many in Iran, particularly the youth, and the result could be seen in potentially violent mass demonstrations directed against both the elected government and the unelected clergy.

The idea of a conservative controlled Iran, especially one constrained by the likes of Mr. Ahmadinejad, does not appeal to anyone who wants to see the spread of democracy in the Middle East. Moreover, although the concept of a democratic Iran seems to have died with this recent election, there are still some positive developments to look forward to. Mr. Ahmadinejad's relationship with Iran's ruling clergy, specifically the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a considerably better one than that of outgoing reformist president Mohammed Khatami. Mr. Ahmadinejad's views on Islamic values and social reforms coincide with those of the Islamic clergy. Henceforth it is likely that where Mr. Khatami had his authority curtailed by those in power in Iran, Mr. Ahmadinejad may, in fact, succeed. Secondly, although Mr. Ahmadinejad has been made notorious by his fundamentalist values, he is still, for the most part, an unknown figure in Iran's political scene. Mr. Ahmadinejad, who is an expert on development, might focus more on developmental issues within Iran, as opposed to the best method of suppressing the population. If there is anyone who has the potential of becoming Iran's Mikhail Gorbachev, it is, without a doubt, Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Although many in the West would like to see Iran become a full-fledged democracy, the possibility that the Islamic theocracy, created by Khomeini, would crumble under the auspices of liberal democratic values is not a realistic one. Iran will never become a full democracy. The dynamics of Khomeinism, which considers the word of God as being superior to that of the word of man and stresses religion as being the omnipresent, undisputed base of governance and society, are mutually exclusive to the tenets of democracy. And now that the pro-Khomeini Conservatives are back in power under the leadership of Mr. Ahmadinejad, it is likely that social reforms and liberal transitions will be put aside indefinitely.

"Iran," as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once said, "never had a revolution in order to have a democracy."

Sources

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